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 FRS 12: AN INTER-INDUSTRY STUDY OF ITS IMPACT ON SHARE 
PRICES 
INTRODUCTION 
Financial Reporting Standard No. 12, ‘Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and 
Contingent Assets’ (FRS 12), is the first accounting standard to comprehensively deal 
with provisions and contingencies in the UK. FRS 12 was developed as part of a joint 
project by the UK’s Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to prevent the use of “big bath” provisioning1 by 
entities as an instrument to reduce reported profits for the year (ASB, 1998; Ernst and 
Young, 1998; Oil Industry Accounting Committee (OIAC), 1999). In order to 
promote the harmonization of accounting, the issuance of FRS 12 on 17 September 
1998 was chosen to coincide and be compatible with the publication of an 
international equivalent, International Accounting Standard No. 37 (IAS 37) 
‘Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets’. Except for differences in 
terminology, IAS 37 and FRS 12 are similar in substance. However, the level of 
guidance on the use of discounting, especially relating to the choice of discount rates 
to be used for net present value calculations, is less clear in the former than in the 
latter (Ernst and Young, 1998; Wilson et al., 2001). FRS 12 became mandatory from 
March 1999, with an option to voluntarily adopt the standard prior to this date. 
During its conception and subsequent introduction, FRS 12 was viewed as 
potentially having a dramatic impact on the financial statements of firms, especially 
those engaged in exploration and production of natural resources, namely, mining, 
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nuclear, oil and gas companies (Hastie, 1997; Newman, 1997; OIAC, 1997; Sharp, 
1998; Wright, 1998; Martin, 1999; Stokdyk, 1999; Cook, 2000; Metcalf, 2000; 
Paterson, 2000; Russell and Fifield, 2000; Trevett and Maugham, 2000; Walker, 
2000; Jetty, 2004). The controversy surrounding this standard centered on the 
potential and often uncertain effects of the new treatment for decommissioning and 
environmental liabilities on the earnings of these firms, as the new treatment calls for 
such liabilities to be accounted for at the outset. The setting-up of these liabilities 
involves high levels of subjectivity, especially when determining the future size of 
environmental and decommissioning costs for large facilities owned by extractive 
firms, and the use of discounting in estimating these costs. These issues, in particular 
discounting, are seen as materially relevant for firms with many long-term liabilities 
such as decommissioning and environmental liabilities, since these cash flows will 
occur far in the future. According to Russell and Fifield (2000), “when it 
[discounting] does apply, the scope for debate over the choice of discount rate will be 
large” (p. 21). In addition, they state that these extra requirements within FRS 12 may 
affect “UK oil and gas firms disproportionately more than other companies” (p. 18). 
As argued by Perks (1993): 
“In so far as directors can determine what is and what is not disclosed they 
can, therefore, influence stock prices. And in so far as accounting standards 
influence what is and what is not disclosed, they too can influence stock 
prices and/or restrict the freedom of management to influence stock prices” 
(p.156). 
Although the impact of FRS 12 is perhaps likely to be most pronounced for 
companies in extractive industries, the standard may also affect other UK companies, 
particularly those with high levels of provisions. Consequently, this paper extends 
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prior research by assessing the impact on company value of the introduction of the 
standard on provisions and contingencies not only on extractive firms, but also on UK 
firms in other industries, such as Pharmaceuticals, Food Producers and Paper, 
Printing, and Packaging, where companies also often have large provisions.  By 
comparing the stock market reaction of ‘other affected’ and extractive companies, we 
are able to ascertain whether the requirements of the standard disproportionately 
affect UK oil, gas and other extractive firms, or whether the standard similarly affect 
companies in other industries where provisions are common. Furthermore, by 
undertaking cross-sectional analyses, we explore what factors may account for the 
stock market reaction to the introduction of the standard. 
A study of the impact of FRS 12 is especially important in light of the recent 
movement towards the use of international financial reporting standards for reporting 
purposes in Europe as well as in many other countries around the world.  As FRS 12 
is similar to its international equivalent IAS 37 (although IAS 37 provides less 
guidance than FRS 12 (Ernst and Young, 1998; Wilson et al., 2001)), an analysis of 
the impact on company value from the introduction of FRS 12 may give us some 
indication of the costs and benefits (from the investors’ point of view) of oil and gas, 
as well as other companies with large provisions, adopting IAS 37.  
Our main results suggest that the introduction of FRS 12 had a positive impact 
on share prices of both the extractive and the other affected firms sampled, but that 
investors in extractive firms reacted much less positively to the standard as compared 
to shareholders in the non-extractive companies sampled. These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that, while the market welcomed the increased level of disclosure 
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and restrictions on “big bath” accounting as prescribed by FRS 12, it was recognized 
that implementing the standard would be more onerous for firms operating in 
extractive industries.  
We also find the stock market reaction was worse for companies that reported 
increases in their provisions after the introduction of the accounting standard2. This is 
consistent with the market viewing the new reporting requirements as burdensome for 
affected companies, possibly due to the complications and costs of estimating the 
appropriate levels of provisions, or the negative impact on reported equity values for 
companies required to substantially increase their levels of provisions.   
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows; section 2 provides a 
background to FRS 12, while section 3 presents the methodology applied in assessing 
the capital market impact of the publication of this standard. The results are presented 
in section 4, while section 5 contains the cross-sectional analyses. Finally, section 6 
discusses the principal conclusions of the paper.  
 
ACCOUNTING FOR PROVISIONS AND CONTINGENCIES  
One of the main reasons for the development of FRS 12 and its international 
equivalent IAS 37 was the need to prevent the use of “big bath” provisioning by 
entities as an instrument to reduce reported profits for the year (ASB, 1998; Ernst and 
Young, 1998; OIAC, 1999). In addition, these standards were designed to improve 
disclosure relating to provisions, as prior to FRS 12 there was no standard in the UK 
which comprehensively dealt with provisions3 (ASB, 1998). The introduction of FRS 
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12 and IAS 37 was also aimed towards promoting international harmonization of 
accounting standards around the world.  
However, despite these proposed benefits, FRS 12 was widely reported as 
potentially having a dramatic effect on the financial statements of extractive firms, 
mainly oil and gas companies, more so than on other firms reporting under the UK 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Specifically, the standard sets 
out the treatment of decommissioning provisions for entities engaged in exploration 
and production of natural resources, namely, mining, nuclear, oil and gas companies. 
According to FRS 12, decommissioning provisions are to be recognized at the 
commencement of the project. Companies will therefore have to estimate and record 
the immediate clean-up liabilities at the outset, even though the actual 
decommissioning will take place far into the future.  
Newman (1997) argues that the “precise nature of the implications is 
uncertain” and that “some small oil companies would probably find the changes 
inappropriate, while others might actually welcome them”. Sharp (1998) is more 
forthright about the effects of the standard on the accounts of companies and 
commented that “… FRS 12 will have a ‘double dip’ impact on many companies’ 
accounts…” as the writing-off process of last year’s provisions against current 
earnings would dramatically affect earnings in the year of transition. Stokdyk (1999) 
highlights this sizeable impact by reporting the effects of adopting FRS 12 by First 
Leisure PLC, which removed provisions of almost £2 millions from its balance sheet 
and concludes that, based on this evidence, “its (FRS 12) effect on provisions may 
well be colossal”. Wright (1998) also suggests that there are many inherent 
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uncertainties relating to the estimation of future costs such as decommissioning and 
environmental liabilities. For example, the determination of the size of 
decommissioning costs is highly controversial and involves a high level of 
subjectivity. According to Bostock (1999), the uncertainties relating to options for 
removal of facilities are large and material in determining the size of the provisions to 
be made and eventually the possible impact of these costs on firm value.  
These implications are further highlighted in Linsmeier et al.’s (1998) study 
on IAS 37, which suggests that provisions and contingencies are relevant in capital 
market valuation decisions. For example, Banks and Kinney (1982) and Frost (1991) 
find that abnormal returns of firms disclosing unexpected loss contingencies are 
significantly more negative than for comparable firms that do not have loss 
contingencies. Blacconiere and Paton (1994) reveal that the capital market reacts 
more negatively when firms with uncertain potential liabilities are not forthcoming 
with reliable information about such costs, and vice versa. Linsmeier et al. (1998) 
further state that estimates about environmental liabilities are considered to be value 
relevant by the capital market; according to them, the estimation rule of liabilities are 
essential for enabling users to assess whether managers are conservative or optimistic 
about such estimations. In addition, the capital market seems to believe that earnings 
with higher estimation errors are less reliable for valuing shares than earnings with 
lower errors.  
Jetty and Russell (2002) investigate the impact of the issuance of FRS 12 on 
the share prices of UK oil and gas companies. They find a significant positive price 
effect related to the release of FRS 12, but that smaller oil and gas firms may view the 
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standard as being more onerous. The results also suggest that the release of FRS 12 
was a signal that firms may disclose value relevant information in the near future. In 
addition, the positive response may be attributable to a resolution of uncertainty about 
the eventual outcome of the standard4 for oil and gas firms.   
Overall, the observers’ comments and prior literature suggest the adoption of 
FRS 12 (and IAS 37 as it is similar to FRS 12) may be value relevant and may have 
dramatic earnings implications for all UK companies, although especially for 
companies in extractive industries. Consequently, this study extends the work of Jetty 
and Russell (2002), by examining the impact of the release of FRS 12 on two groups 
of firms, one made up of extractive firms and the other of companies from non-
extractive industries also likely to be affected by FRS 12 due to their normally high 
levels of provisions (hereby known as non-extractive firms). In particular, we 
examine: (1) if there is a share price reaction associated with the publication of FRS 
12 on companies other than oil and gas companies; (2) if there is a differential share 
price impact between companies which are extractive in nature and non-extractive 
firms; and (3) the likely factors which could explain the abnormal returns observed in 
the event study through a cross-sectional regression analysis of the cumulative 
abnormal returns.  
 
DATA SELECTION AND RESEARCH METHOD 
The sample selected for this study consists of UK firms from the Oil and Gas, 
Mining, Pharmaceuticals, Food Producers and the Paper, Printing and Packaging 
(PPP) industries5. The firms were listed on either the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
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Official List or the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) at the date when the FRS 
was issued: 17 September 1998. These firms had to be based in either the UK or the 
Republic of Ireland (RI)6 and have their daily share price data available from 
Datastream. Any firm announcing disclosures that were likely to affect the share 
prices of the firms during the test period were excluded from the sample. These 
confounding events consisted of earnings news, dividend payouts, oil discoveries and 
the publication of joint venture contracts7. The final sample consists of 90 firms, of 
which 16 operated in the oil and gas industry, 13 in mining, 19 in pharmaceuticals, 23 
were food producers and 19 were PPP firms. News announcements during the test 
period were obtained from the EXTEL UK Weekly Financial News Summary and 
other financial news sources such as the Financial Times newspaper and the ASB’s 
news bulletins. 
To examine the effect on share prices, daily data was obtained from 
Datastream. Share returns are calculated using log returns as follows: 
Rit = Ln(Pit/Pit-1)    [1] 
where Rit is the return on share i on day t, Pit and Pit-1 are the prices for share i on day 
t and day t-1, respectively, and Ln is the natural logarithm. Abnormal returns are 
calculated for the 11-day period from day t-5 to day t+5, centered on the day the new 
accounting standard was issued (day t0): 
ARit = Rit – E(Rit)    [2]  
where ARit is the abnormal return on share i for day t, and E(Rit) is the expected 
return on share i for day t. This study uses an 11-day test period to capture not only 
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the reaction to the announcement, but also any information leakage before the 
publication of FRS 12 and any readjustments after the event. The expected returns are 
calculated using the market model8, which takes into account the systematic risk 
associated with each share: 
E(Rit) = αi + βi(Rmt) + εit    [3] 
In equation [3], αi and βi are estimated from day t-205 to day t-6 and are 
adjusted for thin trading9 using the Dimson Aggregated Coefficient Method (Dimson, 
1979). αi is the constant term for share i and βi is the sensitivity of the returns on share 
i to the returns on the market, Rmt is the return on the Financial Times All-Share 
index for day t, while εit is the random error term for day t.   
Finally, the abnormal returns are adjusted for cross-dependency10 according to 
equation [4]. Specifically, the abnormal returns, ARit, for each share are divided by 
their estimated standard deviation during the estimation period, to yield standardised 
abnormal returns, AR′it, as follows: 
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The test-statistics of the abnormal returns for any given day are then derived using 
equation [7]: 
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The abnormal returns are analysed according to sectors – i.e., the extractive 
sectors (consisting of the oil and gas and mining sectors) against the non-extractive 
sectors (pharmaceutical, food producers and PPP) – over the test period. The 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are analysed over several periods across the test 
window; for instance, the test statistic for CAR over the whole 11-day [-5,+5] 
interval, is the ratio of the CAR to its estimated standard deviation, and is given by: 
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where the terms in the denominator are obtained from equation [5]. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the mean abnormal returns for the sample firms 
(extractive and non-extractive industries) over the 11-day test period, from five days 
prior to the announcement of FRS 12, to five days after the issuance date, which is 
denoted as day zero. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are reported in Panel B. A 
number of points emerge from an analysis of the data. First, the trend of average 
abnormal returns over the 11-day test period for the extractive firms is similar to that 
of the non-extractive firms. The average abnormal returns of the extractive (non-
extractive) firms is negative for six (five) of the eleven days being considered, and the 
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t-test of difference shows that none of the abnormal returns over the period are 
significantly different between the extractive and non-extractive firms. The trend also 
shows that there are instances of significant abnormal returns, possibly indicating 
information leakage, prior to the issuance of FRS 12, on days t-5 and t-3 (day t-5) for 
the extractive (non-extractive) firms.  However, the CARs during the five-day pre-
release period (t-5, t-1) are very small, at -0.001 for firms in the extractive industries 
and 0.002 for the non-extractive firms. Neither is statistically significant, nor is the 
difference in CARs between the industry samples significant. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Second, the mean abnormal returns on the event day (day zero) for both 
extractive and non-extractive firms are positive and significant at the 5 per cent and 1 
per cent level respectively; the extractive firms exhibit a mean (p-value) of 0.008 
(0.037) while their non-extractive counterparts reveal a mean (p-value) of 0.016 
(0.006). This may suggest that the issuance of the standard signals a positive 
movement towards better reporting for both types of firms. The positive share prices 
reactions on the day of the issuance of FRS 12 for the extractive firms on the day of 
the event is consistent with the findings by Jetty and Russell (2002) for oil and gas 
firms. However, although the share price impact for both industry groups is positive, 
the reaction is substantially smaller for firms in the extractive industries than for those 
in the non-extractive industries sampled. The t-test of the difference in event day 
abnormal returns is, however, not statistically significant.  
Third, there is a small readjustment to the abnormal returns over the days after 
the publication of the FRS; the abnormal returns show a reversal from positive to 
negative a few days after the event date for both the extractive and non-extractive 
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firms. Panel B of Table 1 indicates that over the five-day post-release period, negative 
CARs of -0.012 (-0.009) accrue to shareholders of extractive (non-extractive) firms. 
This reversal is, however, not statistically significant.  
Over the whole test period from five days prior, to five days after, the day of 
the standard being made public, the means CAR amounts to -0.005 for the extractive 
companies and 0.009 for the non-extractive firms. Neither is statistically significant, 
nor are they significantly different from each other. Overall, the results in Table 1 
suggest the issuance of FRS 12 resulted in significant abnormal returns for both 
extractive and other affected firms on the day of its release, although the abnormal 
returns were not significant over the longer test period. While the magnitude of the 
gains appears to have been lower for the extractive firms compared to their non-
extractive counterparts, the abnormal returns are not significantly different. 
 
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
While the results in Table 1 suggest there was a significant, if small, average impact 
on the share prices of sample firms on the release of FRS 12, we expect the reaction 
of shareholders to the introduction of the new accounting standard to vary with the 
characteristics of the firm.  In this section we report results of cross-sectional 
analyses11. Specifically, a cross-sectional regression model is fitted to explain the 
CAR over the test window, and in particular the day of the issuance of FRS 12. We 
control for five variables: whether the firm is in an extractive or non-extractive 
industry; the size of the company; whether the company is Irish or UK based; the 
level of provisions reported prior to the switchover to the new FRS; and the change in 
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provision levels reported following the adoption of FRS 1212, as detailed in equation 
[8]: 
iii
iiii
PROVPROV
COUNTRYSIZEEXTRACTIVE
ερµ
λγδη
+∆++
+++=
)()97(
)()()(CAR
 [8] 
In equation [8], η is the constant term and iε  the error term. EXTRACTIVE 
is a variable that takes the value 1 where the firm belongs to one of the extractive 
industries, and 0 if the firm is in one of the non-extractive industries sampled. This 
variable assesses if there are differences in the CARs for extractive firms relative to 
their non-extractive counterparts. Based on prior literature suggesting the 
implementation of the new accounting standard may be particularly onerous for, and 
puts more restrictions on, extractive compared to non-extractive firms, we predict a 
negative coefficient on the EXTRACTIVE variable. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization value (measured in 
£ millions) for each firm as at 17 September 1998 and examines whether CAR is 
related to firm size. Based on prior literature suggesting the standard may be viewed 
as being more onerous for smaller firms who may find the standard costly to 
implement, we would expect a positive coefficient on SIZE. It should be noted, 
however, that an alternative hypothesis may be put forward. It is possible that 
investors will particularly welcome the improvement in disclosure by small 
companies, where arguably little information is available other than that disclosed in 
company accounts. Thus, financial statements may potentially have less value 
relevance for large companies, where investors may rely on other sources of 
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information such as analyst reports or private communication channels (Holland, 
1997), than for small companies. 
The COUNTRY variable represents a firm’s country of origin, where 1 
represents UK firms and 0 represents Irish firms. At the same time as the issuance of 
FRS 12, firms in the Republic of Ireland were preparing to convert to Euros, which 
was set for implementation in January 1999. According to Bris et al. (2005), the 
effects of converting to Euros would result in lowering the cost of capital and 
increasing expected cash flows for firms in countries that adopted the Euro, hence 
improving a firm’s investment opportunities and access to financing. There are 14 
Irish companies in the sample. In order to control for the possibility of such effects, a 
COUNTRY variable is used for the differences in origin of the firms sampled. We 
expect a negative coefficient on COUNTRY. 
As argued above, the introduction of the new accounting standard could be 
expected to be particularly onerous for companies with high levels of provisions.  We 
include the variable PROV97, which captures the levels of long-term provisions, 
scaled by total assets, reported by the sample firms in 1997 – the year before the 
adoption of FRS 12. We predict PROV97 to have a negative impact on abnormal 
returns. 
However, the stock market reaction to the introduction of the accounting 
standard can be expected to be particularly adverse for companies who have to set 
aside substantial additional provisions as a result of the new requirements specified in 
FRS 12. While we acknowledge that investors and/or analysts may not have been 
able to fully anticipate the exact changes in the levels of provisions, we include 
∆PROV to capture the change in provisions from 1997 to 1999 (leaving out 1998 – 
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the year of transition13). Assuming investors were, at least in part, able to predict 
which companies would be required to report additional provisions, we hypothesise 
∆PROV will have a negative impact on CAR. 
Descriptive statistics are contained in Table 2, Panel A, while a correlation 
matrix is contained in Panel B. The descriptive statistics indicate that the extractive 
firms in our sample are on average significantly smaller than the non-extractive 
companies. As the correlation matrix suggests there is a negative (though not 
statistically significant) relationship between event day abnormal returns and 
company size, it may be important to control for size in our cross-sectional analysis.  
The correlation matrix also suggests the abnormal returns on the day of the 
accounting standard being released were significantly higher for Irish than for UK 
companies. As a significantly higher proportion of extractive than non-extractive 
companies in our sample are Irish, we control for country effects when analysing the 
differences in abnormal returns between extractive versus non-extractive firms. 
The level of accounting provisions prior to the introduction of FRS 12 were, 
on average, higher for extractive than for the non-extractive companies, at 2.5 per 
cent and 1.0 per cent of total assets, respectively, although these differences are not 
statistically significant. There were, however, large variations in the levels of 
provisions, ranging from zero to 43 per cent14.  Similarly, the average change in 
provisions from 1997 to 1999 was also somewhat larger for extractive than for non-
extractive firms, at 1.0 and 0.4 percentage points, respectively, although again these 
differences are not statistically significant. The correlation matrix suggests the level 
of abnormal returns on the day of the release of the standard was marginally lower for 
companies with high levels of provisions. However, contrary to expectations, the 
 16
correlation matrix further suggests companies who subsequently reported increased 
provisions earned higher abnormal returns on day zero than companies for which the 
change in provisions was smaller. As PROV97 and ∆PROV are significantly 
negatively correlated (suggesting companies with few provisions prior to FRS 12 
were more likely to report large increases in their levels of provisions after the 
introduction of the standard), it may be important to control for these variables 
simultaneously rather than focusing on univariate correlations. It should be noted, 
however, that while some of the independent variables are significantly correlated, 
the correlation coefficients (at a maximum of about 0.4) suggests our cross-sectional 
regression model, as detailed in equation [8], will not be subject to colinearity 
problems. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
The results from the cross-sectional regression analyses, based on equation 
[8], are shown in Table 3. We report significance levels based on heteroscedasticity-
adjusted t-statistics (White, 1980). For the five-day pre-release period (t-5, t-1), none 
of the explanatory variables are significant, and the regression model overall has no 
explanatory power. In contrast, the regression model for the event day is significant, 
with an adjusted R2 of 8.5 per cent. Three of the five explanatory variables, as well as 
the constant term, are statistically significant. The positive and highly significant 
constant term is consistent with the generally positive reaction to the release of the 
new accounting standard, as detailed in Table 1. However, while the results in Table 
1 indicate the difference in abnormal returns between extractive and non-extractive 
companies is not significant, the industry effect becomes significant once we control 
for other variables in the cross-sectional analysis. As can be seen from Table 3, the 
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coefficient for EXTRACTIVE on the event day, at –0.016, is significant at the 5 per 
cent level, confirming that investors view the issuance of FRS 12 less positively for 
extractive firms than for companies in non-extractive industries also likely to be 
affected by the standard. This supports the hypothesis that, while the release of the 
standard is overall positive, firms which are extractive in nature may find the 
implementation of the standard more burdensome since it sets out additional 
requirements relating to decommissioning and environmental liabilities which are 
mainly applicable to such firms. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Our results suggest the COUNTRY variable is negative and significant for the 
event day and for the overall analysis period. The negative COUNTRY coefficient 
indicates that UK firms may view the standard less favourably than their Irish 
counterparts; this supports the controlling hypothesis regarding the potential benefits 
that could be derived from converting to Euros, as suggested by Bris et al. (2005). 
The results in Table 3 indicate SIZE had a small, though insignificant, 
negative impact on the event day abnormal returns. This result rejects the hypothesis 
that smaller firms may find the standard more onerous than their larger counterparts. 
Instead, investors in small companies appear to react marginally more favourably to 
the issuance of FRS 12 than do investors in large companies, although this effect is 
not statistically significant.  
While the level of long-term provisions (PROV97) prior to the release of the 
standard appears to have had an insignificant impact on the abnormal returns during 
the day of the release of the new accounting standard, we observe a significant 
positive coefficient on the change in provisions from 1997 to 1999. This is contrary to 
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our expectations of the impact of the introduction of FRS 12 being particularly 
onerous for companies reporting large increases in provisions after the introduction of 
the standard. However, while statistically significant, the economic impact is 
relatively small. As indicated in Table 1, the average change in provisions, scaled by 
total assets, was one percentage point for extractive firms. Therefore, the coefficient 
of 0.054 for ∆PROV suggests a company with average levels of change in provisions 
would have day zero abnormal returns 0.05 percentage points lower than a firm with 
no change in provisions after the introduction of FRS 12. Despite this, the result 
supports the findings shown in Table 1 which suggest that, on first impressions, the 
standard signalled a positive move towards better reporting by firms which were 
initially reporting high levels of provisions.   
Interestingly, a further check on Table 3 shows changes in signs for the 
coefficients of both the level and change in provisions in the five-day post release 
period (t+1, t+5). While the coefficient for the level of provisions is not significant at 
conventional levels, the coefficient for the change in provisions is highly significant. 
While the immediate reaction to the publication of FRS 12 appears to have been to 
mark down the value of extractive compared to other companies, analysis of the post-
release window suggests the market took a more nuanced view of which companies 
would be adversely affected by the requirements of the new standard on ‘Provisions, 
Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets’. While many extractive firms would 
see changes in the reporting of provisions, not all firms in the oil, gas or mining 
sectors would be equally affected by the standard. Analysis of the five-day post 
release period shows the abnormal returns to be lower for companies with high levels 
of provisions.  While the coefficient of –0.370 is not significant under White-adjusted 
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estimation, it is statistically significant using robust rank regressions. More 
importantly, however, companies that reported increased provisions in the year after 
the introduction of the new accounting standard earned significantly lower abnormal 
returns. The coefficient is significant at the 1 per cent level and, at –0.704, is 
substantially larger than the positive coefficient (of 0.054) for the event day. This 
suggests that, once the market had time to digest the implications of the new standard, 
share prices of those companies most directly affected by the new provision 
requirements due to the company being required to make additional provisions after 
the introduction of FRS 12, were marked down compared to other companies in the 
same industries less directly affected by the standard. 
The results for the overall eleven-day event window are similar to those of the 
post-release period, with an insignificant negative coefficient for PROV97 (at –0.360) 
and a highly significant negative coefficient for ∆PROV (at –0.635), significant at the 
1 per cent level). The adjusted R2 amounts to a highly significant 28.4 per cent. The 
results suggest that, while shareholders overall welcomed the introduction of the new 
accounting standard (as indicated by the significant positive abnormal returns on the 
day of release) – possibly due to the restrictions imposed on ‘big bath’ provisions – 
there was a recognition by the market that the new provision requirements would be 
onerous for companies with large provisions and, in particular, for companies having 
to report increased levels of provisions after the introduction of FRS 12.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The publication of Financial Reporting Standard No. 12, ‘Provisions, Contingent 
Liabilities and Contingent Assets’ (FRS 12) restricted companies’ abilities to make 
“big bath” provisions, and required extractive companies to make provisions for 
abandonment costs at the outset of the project. The objective of this paper is to 
examine whether the issuance of FRS 12 had an impact on the share prices of UK 
companies, and whether the price effect was different for extractive firms compared 
to companies in non-extractive industries also likely to be affected by the standard 
due to their generally high levels of provisions. As the International Accounting 
Standard 37 is similar to FRS 12 (although IAS 37 provides less guidance on the 
issue of provisions compared to FRS 12), our results may also provide a possible 
insight into the likely impact on affected firms, in particular oil and gas companies, of 
the current implementation of international financial reporting standards by 
companies in Europe and elsewhere. 
Our results suggest that changes in accounting standards, leading to a change 
in the accounting numbers reported to investors, might have a major impact on share 
prices. This supports the notion that accounting statements are value relevant; 
specifically, the standards (rules) governing the reporting of these statements may be 
valued by the market, as suggested by Perks (1993). In particular, our findings 
support the hypothesis that the issuance of FRS 12 had, on average, a significant 
positive impact on share prices for both extractive and non-extractive firm. This is 
consistent with the publication of FRS 12 being seen as likely to result in beneficial 
restrictions on “big bath” provisions, and an improvement in the transparency of 
 21
information provided by companies regarding provisions and contingencies. Such 
information regarding the costs and uncertainties borne by firms is likely to be value 
relevant. 
However, our results further suggest that the share price impact was 
significantly less positive for extractive firms (operating in the oil and gas or mining 
industries) than for non-extractive companies operating in the pharmaceuticals, food 
producers, or paper, printing and packaging (PPP) industries. This may be due to the 
implied greater effect of accounting for decommissioning and environmental 
liabilities on the earnings of extractive firm. Furthermore, extractive firms may find 
the implementation of the standard more onerous, given the additional requirements 
regarding how decommissioning and environmental liabilities are recorded and 
published to users of information. Indeed, we find strong evidence of a negative price 
impact on companies that went on to report large increases in the levels of provisions 
after the adoption of the new standard.  This suggests the new reporting requirements 
were expected to be onerous and costly for the firms most severely affected. 
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Table 1 
Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for sample sectors 
around the issuance of FRS 12 
P a n e l A
D a y s E x tr a c t iv e O th e r T -te s t  o f  
M e a n M e a n d if fe r e n c e
(p -v a lu e ) (p -v a lu e ) (p -v a lu e )
-5 0 .0 1 8 * * 0 .0 2 0 * * * (0 .7 9 8 )
(0 .0 2 7 ) (0 .0 0 5 )
-4 -0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 0 2 (0 .8 5 2 )
(0 .8 3 4 ) (0 .8 1 3 )
-3 -0 .0 1 5 * * * -0 .0 1 4 (0 .8 3 6 )
(0 .0 0 3 ) (0 .1 0 1 )
-2 -0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 0 3 (0 .9 5 8 )
(0 .5 7 0 ) (0 .8 4 2 )
-1 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 (0 .9 9 6 )
(0 .8 0 0 ) (0 .6 1 6 )
0 0 .0 0 8 * * 0 .0 1 6 * * * (0 .2 7 4 )
(0 .0 3 7 ) (0 .0 0 6 )
1 0 .0 1 4 0 .0 0 5 (0 .1 0 2 )
(0 .1 4 6 ) (0 .1 9 4 )
2 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 3 (0 .8 5 5 )
(0 .4 4 8 ) (0 .6 8 4 )
3 -0 .0 0 7 -0 .0 1 2 * * (0 .1 7 7 )
(0 .2 9 5 ) (0 .0 5 0 )
4 -0 .0 1 2 * * -0 .0 1 1 (0 .9 0 3 )
(0 .0 3 0 ) (0 .1 4 5 )
5 -0 .0 1 2 0 .0 0 6 (0 .3 1 7 )
(0 .1 9 3 ) (0 .6 2 3 )
P a n e l B
P e r io d s E x tr a c t iv e O th e r T -te s t  o f  
M e a n M e a n d if fe r e n c e
(p -v a lu e ) (p -v a lu e ) (p -v a lu e )
P re -re le a se  C A R [-5 ,-1 ] -0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 2 (0 .5 9 4 )
(0 .9 9 7 ) (0 .9 9 7 )
P o s t-re le a se  C A R [+ 1 ,+ 5 ] -0 .0 1 2 -0 .0 0 9 (0 .5 4 0 )
(0 .9 7 5 ) (0 .9 8 6 )
O v e ra ll  C A R [-5 ,+ 5 ] -0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 9 (0 .5 7 7 )
(0 .9 9 3 ) (0 .9 9 0 )
Notes: Days –5 to +5 represent the 11-day test period, with day t0 being the date of issuance of FRS 12 for firms in 
extractive (oil, gas and mining) and ‘other affected’ (pharmaceuticals, food producers, and paper, printing and 
packaging) industries. The mean p-values depict the significance of the daily average residuals under the 
parametric two–tailed tests where Ho: mean = 0, Ha: mean ≠ 0. The t-test of difference provides a comparison 
between the two sample industries.  *, ** and *** indicate significant p-values at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent 
significance level, respectively.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
  Panel A       
  Descriptive statistics      
    Extractive Other Difference 
 Sample   29 61  
       
 Size  Mean 1.005 1.602 -0.597*** 
   Median 0.883 1.592 (0.000) 
   St dev 0.674 0.682  
   Min -0.161 -0.066  
   Max 2.490 3.212  
       
 Country  UK 21 55 0.272** 
   Ireland 8 6 (0.030) 
   UK % 72.4% 90.2%  
       
 Prov 97  Mean 0.025 0.010 0.014 
   Median 0.000 0.000 (0.283) 
   St dev 0.082 0.045  
   Min 0.000 0.000  
   Max 0.431 0.339  
       
 ∆ prov  Mean 0.010 0.004 0.006 
   Median 0.000 0.000 (0.763) 
   St dev 0.145 0.028  
   Min -0.431 -0.077  
   Max 0.628 0.161  
  Panel B       
  Correlation matrix      
   CAR [0] Extractive Size Country Prov 97 ∆ Prov 
  CAR [0]  -0.133 -0.098 -0.186* -0.066 0.166 
  Extractive   -0.114  -0.384*** -0.229** 0.114 0.032 
  Size   0.026 -0.391***  -0.094 -0.083 -0.132 
  Country   -0.201* -0.229** -0.093  0.099 0.026 
  Prov 97   -0.028 0.034 0.074 0.037  -0.412*** 
  ∆ Prov   0.181* 0.028 0.038 -0.030 -0.361***  
Notes: The table contains descriptive statistics for the variables in the cross-sectional regressions based on 
equation [8]. DIFFERENCE is calculated for Size, Prov 97 and ∆prov as the difference in means using a two-
sample difference in means t-test, and for Country as the difference in proportion of Irish firms using a Chi-
squared test.  P-values are reported in parentheses based on two-tailed tests.  In Panel B, Pearson correlations are 
reported in the top right hand corner, while Spearman correlations are reported in the bottom left corner. 
EXTRACTIVE is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for companies in extractive industries (oil, gas and 
mining) and the value 0 for companies in ‘other affected industries’ (pharmaceuticals, food producers, and paper, 
printing and packaging); SIZE is the natural log of the market value (in £ millions); COUNTRY is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 for UK companies and 0 for Irish companies; Prov97 refers to provision levels 
reported, scaled by total assets, by sample firms in 1997 while ∆prov indicates the change in provision levels 
reported, scaled by total assets, by sample firms between 1997 and 1999.  *, ** and *** indicate significant p-
values at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent significance level, respectively.  
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Table 3 
Cross-sectional analysis of the share price reaction over different periods 
around the issuance of FRS 12 
  Predicted Pre-release Event date Post release Overall 
  Variables Sign CAR [-5,-1] CAR [0] CAR [+1,+5] CAR [-5,+5] 
  Constant  0.011 0.046*** -0.014 0.043 
   (0.667) (0.000) (0.499) (0.249) 
      
  EXTRACTIVE - -0.005 -0.016** 0.010 -0.010 
   (0.801) (0.040) (0.466) (0.660) 
      
  COUNTRY - -0.013 -0.020** -0.001 -0.035* 
   (0.467) (0.029) (0.915) (0.075) 
      
  SIZE + 0.002 -0.007 0.008 0.002 
   (0.833) (0.119) (0.373) (0.879) 
      
  PROV 97 - -0.012 0.022 -0.370 -0.360 
   (0.858) (0.471) (0.185) (0.136) 
      
  ∆ PROV - 0.015 0.054*** -0.704*** -0.635*** 
   (0.693) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
  Adj R2  0.0% 8.5% 52.3% 28.4% 
  Wald test  1.01 26.24*** 17.70*** 18.16*** 
  Probability  (0.962) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) 
Notes: The table shows the coefficients for each variable from OLS regressions of equation [8], with p-values 
based on White (1980) adjusted t-statistics reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significant p-values at 
the 10, 5 and 1 per cent significance level, respectively, using two-tailed t-tests. Adj R2 is the adjusted goodness 
of fit of the equation explained by the variables. Coefficients changing sign or losing significance under robust 
rank regression estimation are highlighted in italics. EXTRACTIVE is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for 
companies in extractive industries (oil, gas and mining) and the value 0 for companies in ‘other affected 
industries’ (pharmaceuticals, food producers, and paper, printing and packaging); SIZE is the natural log of the 
market value (in £ millions); COUNTRY is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for UK companies and 0 for 
Irish companies; PROV97 refers to provision levels reported, scaled by total assets, by sample firms in 1997 
while ∆PROV indicates the change in provision levels reported, scaled by total assets, by sample firms between 
1997 and 1999.   
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Notes 
                                                 
1 “Big bath” provisioning refers to writing-off large provisions against earnings with the objective of 
avoiding or minimizing future shortfalls. Provision refers to a liability of uncertain timing or amount.  
2 The difference in the levels of provisions reported in 1999 and 1997 were used to reflect the change 
after adopting FRS 12 since 1998 is the transitional period for conversion; FRS 12 stipulates that firms 
are to formally adopt the standard from March 1999, with the option to voluntarily adopt the standard 
earlier within their financial statements. Since FRS 12 was published in 1998, there would be instances 
where some firms might not have adjusted their 1998 accounts to fully reflect the new requirements. 
Given the differences in year-ends for the companies sampled and the likelihood of a stagger of 
adoption by firms in their 1998 statements, we have assumed 1998 as the transitional period for 
conversion whilst 1999 was the period after full conversion. 
3 Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 18 ‘Accounting for Contingencies’ was the only standard 
that dealt with contingencies and in parts, provisions. This standard was eventually superseded by FRS 
12. 
4 Although the releases of FRS 12’s preceding drafts, i.e., the Discussion Paper and Exposure Draft, 
contained various intentions towards changes in how companies account for provisions and 
contingencies, FRS 12 extended and modified those plans suggested by the earlier drafts, whilst 
introducing further new changes to its requirements. For example, FRS 12 provides detailed 
explanations on the use of discounting, while the previous drafts only referred to its use for companies. 
FRS 12 also introduces a clause, which allows companies to not disclose information which could 
seriously prejudice the position of the entity. Given the substantive changes between the Exposure 
Draft and the final standard, the publication of FRS 12 on 17 September 1998 would be expected to 
have a significant price impact. 
5 Oil and gas and mining sectors were chosen due to their extractive activities in the exploration and 
production of natural resources, while the other three sectors were selected for comparison, as 
companies in these non-extractive sectors generally have high levels of provisions and may thus also 
be expected to be affected by the standard. 
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6 Paragraph 17.45(a) of the UK Listing Rules issued by the Financial Services Authority, which 
outlines the accounting standards requirements for overseas companies, states that: An overseas firm 
must issue an annual report and accounts which must be drawn up and independently audited in 
accordance with the requirements of the applicant’s national law and, in all material respect, with UK 
GAAP, United States GAAP or IAS. For the purposes of this research, it is therefore necessary to 
exclude overseas companies that are not wholly subjected to UK GAAP. As per the Foreword to 
Accounting Standard issued by the ASB (ASB, 2000), para.14: Accounting standards should be 
applied to UK and Republic of Ireland group financial statements.   
7 From the original sample of 198 firms, 108 firms made other prices sensitive announcements during 
the test window. See Foster (1980) and Wright (1987) for a discussion regarding the treatment of 
confounding events. 
8 A market adjusted returns model (i.e. the index model) was also used to determine the abnormal 
returns; the results obtained were similar to the market model abnormal returns reported here.  
9 Infrequent or non-synchronous trading gives rise to share prices which are recorded intermittently 
whereas for shares which are traded frequently, the recordings are almost continuous. As prices are 
recorded only at distinct, random intervals, completely accurate calculation of returns over any fixed 
period is virtually impossible. This problem becomes more severe when using daily data. (Dimson, 
1979).  
10 These hypothesis testing methods are derived from Brown and Warner (1985). 
11 Robust rank regressions were also conducted to support the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
shown in the paper. The results obtained were similar to the OLS regressions.  
12 The levels of provision reported in 1998 were excluded from the analysis as those levels were 
reported during the transitional period of the adoption of FRS 12; the standard must be formally 
adopted from March 1999, with a choice of earlier adoption possible. In order to eliminate the stagger 
of implementation within the 1998 financial statements, we have assumed 1998 as the transitional 
period of conversion. We use 1997 data to capture the level of provisions prior to the introduction of 
the standard, and 1999 to represent the provisions reported after the adoption, since 1999 was the 
formal date of implementation for all firms. We scale provisions by total assets.    
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13 See note 2. 
14 Extractive firms often prefer to avoid decommissioning and clean-up costs by leasing facilities from 
other bigger firms, hence the existence of extractive firms with zero long-term provisions. In the case 
of the other affected firms in the sample, the nature of provisions reported is often not far enough into 
the future, thus there are instances of firms with zero long-term provisions. Nevertheless, when firms 
do report such provisions, these costs are often materially relevant.  
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